Battle of Pydna

From Open Encyclopedia

This article is about the 168 BC battle. For the 148 BC battle, see Battle of Pydna (148 BC).

{{Infobox Military Conflict |conflict=Battle of Pydna |partof=the Third Macedonian War |image= |caption= ||date=22 June, 168 BC |place=Near Pydna |result=Decisive Roman victory |combatant1=Macedon |combatant2=Roman Republic |commander1=Perseus of Macedon |commander2=Lucius Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus |strength1=44,000 |strength2=38,000 |casualties1=25,000 killed and wounded |casualties2=unknown }}

Macedonian Wars
1st Lamia - 2nd Lamia – Cynoscephalae – Callicinus - 1st Pydna – 2nd Pydna

The Battle of Pydna in 168 BC between Rome and the Antigonid dynasty represents the start of the true power of Rome, and the end of the Antigonid line, Macedonian kings whose power traces to Alexander the Great. It is often also considered to be the classic example of the Macedonian phalanx vs. Roman legion systems of warfare, with the former proving inferior, though this conclusion is not so clear.

The Third Macedonian War started in 169 BC after a number of actions on the part of Perseus of Macedon incited Rome to declare war. At first the Romans achieved a number of small victories, largely due to Perseus' refusal to consolidate his armies. By the end of the year the tide had changed dramatically and Perseus had regained most of his losses, including the important religious city of Dion. Perseus then established himself in an unassailable position on the river Elpeus, in northeastern Greece.

The next year command of the Roman expeditionary force passed to Lucius Aemilius Paullus, an experienced soldier who was one of the consuls for the year. In order to force Perseus from his ground, Paullus sent a small force (8,200 foot and 120 horse) under the command of Scipio Nasica to the coast, a feint to convince Perseus that they were attempting a riverborne flanking manuver. Instead, that night Scipio took his force south, and over the mountains to the west of the Roman and Macedonian armies. They moved as far as Pithium then swung northeast to take the Macedonians in the rear.

A Roman deserter, however, made his way to the Macedonian camp and Perseus sent Milo with a force of 12,000 to block the approach road. The encounter that followed sent Milo and his men back in disarray towards the main Macedonian army. After this Perseus moved his army northwards and took up a position near Katerini, a village south of Pydna. It was a fairly level plain and was very suited to the operation of the phalanx.

Paullus then had Scipio rejoin the main force, while Perseus deployed his forces for what appeared to be an attack from the south by Scipio. The Roman armies were actually to the west, and when they advanced they found Perseus fully deployed. Instead of joining battle with troops tired from the march, they encamped to the west in the foothills of Mount Olocrus.

Next day, June 22, the armies waited until the afternoon when fighting actually began. The exact cause of the start of the battle differs across reports; one story is that Paullus waited until late enough in the day for the sun not to be in the eyes of his troops, and then sent an unbridled horse forward to bring about alarm. More likely it was the result of some Roman foragers getting a little too close and being attacked by some Thracians in Perseus' army.

Image:Pydna battle plan.jpg In terms of numbers the two armies appear quite evenly matched. The Romans had 38,000 men, of which 33,400 were infantry, including two legions. The Macedonians had 44,000 soldiers, of which 21,000 were phalangites. The cavalry numbers were roughly equal, about 4,000 each. The two armies were drawn up in their usual fashions. The Romans had placed the two legions in the middle, with the allied Latin, Italian and Greek infantry flanking them. The cavalry had been placed on the wings, with the Roman right being supplemented by 22 elephants. The phalanx took up the centre of the Macedonian line, with the elite 3,000-strong Guard formed to the left of the phalanx. Lighter peltasts, mercenaries and Thracian infantry guarded the two flanks of the phalanx, while the Macedonian cavalry were also, rather unevenly, split between the two wings. The strongest contingent was on the Macedonian right, where Perseus commanded the heavy cavalry (including his elite Sacred Squadron), and the Thracian Odrysian cavalry were deployed.

The two centres engaged at about 3pm, with the Macedonians advancing on the Romans a short distance from the Roman camp. Paullus claimed later that the sight of the phalanx had filled him with alarm and amazement. The Romans tried to beat down the enemy pikes or hack off their points, but with little success. Unable to get under the thick bristle of spikes, the Romans were beaten back, and some of their allies abandoned the field.

But as the phalanx pushed forward, the ground became more uneven as it moved into the foothills, and the line lost its cohesion. Paullus now ordered the legions into the gaps, attacking the phalangites on their exposed flanks. At close quarters the longer Roman sword and heavier shield easily prevailed over the short sword (more of a dagger) and lighter armor. They were soon joined by the Roman right, which had succeeded in routing the Macedonian left.

Seeing the tide of battle turn, Perseus fled with the cavalry on the Macedonian right. According to Plutarch, Perseus' cavalry had yet to engage, and both the King and his cavalry were accused of cowardice by the surviving infantry. There weren't too many of these, however; the 3,000 Guard fought to the death, and in total the Macedonians suffered about 25,000 dead or captured of their 40,000.

Perseus later surrendered to Paullus, and was paraded in triumph in Rome. He was then imprisoned. The Macedonian kingdom was dissolved, and replaced with three republics. In time these were also dissolved, and Macedonia became a Roman province.

The battle is often considered to be a victory of the Roman legion's flexibility over the phalanx's inflexibility, some argue that the loss was actually due to a failure of command on the part of Perseus. Now whilst this is true to a small extent it doesn’t hide the fact that the Macedonian did not have an answer to the problem of being out flanked by the Romans. Lucius Aemilius Paullus knew this before the battle that once the hoplite phalanx had been committed to the battle turning to meet a threat on either of its flanks is near impossible without disrupting the formations cohesiveness. In addition to this at the start of the battle half of his army was still getting into position due to the complex nature of the Macedonian system of warfare.

The centuries that moved into the gaps on the flanks of the phalanx happened before Perseus could responded by sending in lighter troops to fill the gaps. Even if this would have been possible as the battle moved to broken ground (which was a disadvantage to both sides but more so the for the Macedonians) the Romans were able to get in closer to the hoplites and use their short swords to full effect.

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Macedonian political manoeuvering behind the scenes

The course of the battle raises many questions, one of the most critical concerning the half hearted efforts of the better Macedonian cavalry, which allowed the opposition to scatter the phalanx without apparent difficulty. Later, at a crucial moment, when the battle was going badly, the cavalry failed to intervene to restore the balance. Such intervention at this point would even have justified its sacrifice.

Perseus has been held responsible for this mistake by some sources, who present him as being defeated before the battle had begun, (see above) and suggest that there were many occasions during its course when he could have won. It is possible that the catastrophic negligence of the Macedonian cavalry, lay in political motives. The cavalrymen were the sons of the Macedonian aristocratic families, who had become displeased with Perseus because of his political approach favouring the masses. The concentration of so many infantry forces, made up of the ordinary people, gives some clue to Perseus’ feelings towards the masses. This might have been the correct military tactic to fight the Romans, but it brought the King into conflict with those of his own class. Perseus was an ill-tempered person, and this in all probability led to a conspiracy, which revealed itself during the critical phase of the dramatic conflict.

The war with the Romans had taken on an intensely political dimension as well as an ethnic nature. The Oligarchs of the Greek states, as well as the Macedonian Aristocrats, sided with the Romans in order to save their fortunes and their privileges. In so doing, they aimed to preserve their benefits as a nation. On the other hand, the masses of poor people stood and fought to the end, which is the reason for the huge number of dead. This point of view is reinforced by the fact that the cavalrymen abandoned their King, in order to reorganise the remaining forces and find new ones, probably mercenaries. Perseus was betrayed by the ruling class of his country, and was left to be defeated, with disastrous consequences for his country, if not for the entire nation. A short while later he was betrayed again, and taken captive by the victor Aimilio Pavlo.

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Political Aftermath

This was not the final battle, but it broke the metaphorical back of Greek power. The political consequences of the lost battle for the Macedonians were reflected by the Roman Senate. Macedonia was abolished and the lands were re-divided as four federated republican leagues that were separate from each other by culture and law, so not even marriage between the newly formed leagues was allowed and property ownership could not be intermingled. It was declared treason to have ever served with the Macedonian leader Perseus; any Macedonian in Greece found to have served with Perseus was killed. Also, Paullus, after success, allowed seventy townships of the Macedonians to be plundered and sold 150,000 Epirotes into slavery. These slaves eventually caused Roman culture to take on a Greek character, while the power of the Macedonians was eternally broken.

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References

J.F.C. Fuller. A Military History of the Western World: From he Earliest Times To The Battle of Lepanto. Da Capo Press, Inc. A Subsidiary of Plenum Publishing Corporation. 233 Sprint Street, New York, N.Y. 10013. ISBN 0-306-80304-6 (v. 1). pp. 151 to 169.
Pydna