Battle of Lake Trasimene

{{Infobox Military Conflict |conflict=Battle of Lake Trasimene |partof=the Second Punic War |image=Image:Battles second punic war.png |caption= |date=June 24, 217 BC |place=Lake Trasimene, Italy |casus= |territory= |result=Carthaginian victory |combatant1=Carthage |combatant2=Roman Republic |commander1=Hannibal |commander2=Gaius Flaminius † |strength1=30,000-40,000 soldiers |strength2=30,000 soldiers |casualties1=virtually none |casualties2=about 15,000 }}

Second Punic War
Ticinus – Trebia – Lake Trasimene – Cannae – 1st Nola – 2nd Nola – 3rd Nola – 1st Capua – Silarus – 1st Herdonia – Upper Baetis – 2nd Capua – 2nd Herdonia – Numistro – Asculum – Baecula – Grumentum – Metaurus – Ilipa – Crotona – Bagbrades – Zama

The Battle of Lake Trasimene (June 24, 217 BC, April on the Julian calendar) was a Roman defeat in the Second Punic War between the Carthaginians under Hannibal and the Romans under the consul Gaius Flaminius. The battle is perhaps one of the largest and most successful ambushes in military history.

Contents 1 Prelude 2 Battle 2.1 Tactical Disposition 2.2 Events 3 Aftermath 4 Trivia 5 References

Prelude

After the battles of Ticinus and Trebia, Flaminius' army turned south to prepare a defense near Rome itself. Hannibal immediately set out to follow, but marched faster and soon passed the Roman army. Flaminius was forced to increase the speed of his march in order to bring Hannibal to battle before reaching the city. Another force under Servilius was due to join Flaminius.

Before this could happen, Hannibal decided to lure Flaminius into a pitched battle, by devastating under his very own eyes the area he had been sent to protect. As Polybius tells us, “he [Hannibal] calculated that, if he passed the camp and made a descent into the district beyond, Flaminius—partly for fear of popular reproach and partly of personal irritation—would be unable to endure watching passively the devastation of the country but would spontaneously follow him . . . and give him opportunities for attack.” [Hart 26]. At the same time, he tried to sever the allegiance of Rome’s allies, by proving that she was powerless to protect them. Despite of this, Hannibal found Flaminius still passively encamped at Arretium. Unable to draw Flaminius into battle by mere devastation, Hannibal marched boldly around his opponent’s left flank and effectively cut Flaminius off from Rome. The moral effect of this maneuver on Flaminius’s men, having the enemy between them and Rome and letting him devastate their countryside, as well as being restricted from battle, could not have been but frustrating for them. Still, Flaminius remained in camp with his army. Hannibal decided to move towards Apulida, hoping that Flaminius might, instead, follow him to a battlefield of his own choosing, which is exactly what he had done.

Flaminius, to eager to exact revenge for the devastation of the countryside, and facing increasing political criticism from Rome, finally decided to march against Hannibal. Flaminius, like Sempronius, was of an impetuous and over-confident character, and lacked self-control. His advisors suggested that he send only send a cavalry detachment to harass the Carthaginians and prevent them from laying waste to any more of the country, while reserving his main force until the other consul, Servilius, arrived with his army. However, it proved impossible to argue with the rash Flaminius. “Though every other person in the council advised safe rather than showy measures,” writes Livy, “urging that he should wait for his colleague, in order that joining their armies, they might carry on the war with united courage and counsels . . . Flaminius, in a fury. . . gave out the signal for marching for battle.” [Contrell 104]

Battle

Tactical Disposition

As Hannibal passed Lake Trasmimene, he came to a place very suitable for an ambuscade, and hearing that Flaminius had broken camp and was pursuing him, made preparations for the next impeding battle. To the north was a series of heavily forested hills where the Malpasso Road passed along the north side of Lake Trasimene. Along the hill-bordered skirts of the lake, Hannibal camped where he was in full view of any one entering the northern defile, and spent the night arranging his troops for battle. Below the camp, he placed his heavy infantry (Iberians, Celts, and Africans) upon a slight elevation. Here, they had been given ample charging ground from which they could rush down with effect, upon the head of the Roman column on the left flank, when it should reach the position [Dodge 301]. His cavalry and Gallic infantry was concealed in the hills in the dept of the wooden valley from which the Romans would first enter, so that the they could quickly sally out and close the entrance, and prevent a means of retreat for the Romans. While he posted his light troops at intervals along the height overlooking the plain, with orders to keep well hidden in the woods until signaled to attack. In addition, the night before the battle commenced, Hannibal had ordered his men to light campfires on the hills of Tuoro, at a considerable distance, so as to convince the Romans that his forces were farther away than they actually were.

Events

The next morning the Roman troops approached eastward along the road running across the northern edge of the lake. Eager for battle, the Flaminius pushed his men mercilessly, and hurried up the column in the rear. Hannibal then sent a small skirmish force to draw their van away from the front of the line, allowing the rest of the Roman army time to set up for an assault to the east. As soon as Romans marched through a long, foggy and narrow valley and had entered the plains, trumpets had been blown and sounded the signal for attack. From that very moment, the Carthaginian cavalry and infantry came down from the surrounding hills with an enormous impact, sealed of the defile, and engaged the enemy the unsuspecting Romans from all sides. Surprised and outmaneuvered, Romans did not have time to draw up in their usual battle array they were accustomed to, and were forced to fight a helpless hand-to-hand battle in open order. The Romans were quickly split into three forces. The westernmost was attacked by the Carthaginian cavalry and were forced into the lake, thereby surrounding the other two groups. The center, including Flaminius, stood their ground, but were eventually cut down by Hannibal's Gauls after three hours of heavy combat.

Image:Battle of lake trasimene.gif

In a brief space of three hours, the entire Roman army was annihilated. The van saw little combat throughout, and once the disaster to their rear became obvious, they cut their way through the skimishers and out of the forest. Only 6,000 men barely managed to cut their way to safety under the cover of the fog, but were later captured the following day. Of the remaining thirty thousand, half were either killed or drowned (including Flaminius himself) and the other half was captured. Hannibal losses, on the other hand, did not even exceed 1,500 men (a ratio of one Carthaginian for every ten Romans). But the disaster for Rome did not end there. Within a day or two, a reinforcement of four thousand Roman troops was intercepted, and they too were destroyed. Hannibal, emerging form another brilliant victory, had successfully laid and achieved the greatest ambush in history [Hart 26].

Aftermath

The news of the defeat caused a panic in Rome once news reached the city. Quintus Fabius Maximus was elected dictator by the Senate and adopted a "Fabian strategy" of avoiding conflict until Rome could restore its military strength. Hannibal was left largely free to ravage Apulia for the next year, until the Romans withdrew the dictatorship and elected Paullus and Varro as consuls. The result would be Battle of Cannae, perhaps the worst defeat the Roman would suffer throughout the Second Punic war.

Trivia

• Livy states that so terrible was the massacre at Lake Trasimene, that neither army was aware of the occurrence of an earthquake, which as the very moment of the battle “overthrew large portions of many of the cities of Italy, turned rivers, and leveled mountains with an awful crash” [Dodge 305].

• An ancient tradition says that because of the blood, which for over three days filled the water, that the name of a small stream feeding the lake was renamed Sanguineto, the “Blood River” [Gowen].

References

• Cottrell, Leonard, Enemy of Rome, Evans Bros, 1965. ISBN 0237443201 (pbk)
• Cottrell, Leonard, Enemy of Rome, Evans Bros, 1965. ISBN 0237443201 (pbk)
• Hart, Liddell Strategy New York City, New York; Penguin Group; 1967
• Dodge, Theodore. Hannibal. Cambridge Massachusetts: De Capo Press, 1891 ISBN 0306813629
• “Hannibal Barca and the Punic Wars” By Hilary Gowen

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